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Abstract. This paper describes a higher-order logic with ne-grained intensional-
ity (FIL). Unlike traditional Montogovian type theory, intensionality is treated as
basic, rather than derived through possible worlds. This allows for ne-grained in-
tensionality without impossible worlds. Possible worlds and modalities are dened
algebraically. The proof theory for FIL is given as a set of tableau rules, and an alge-
braic model theory is specied. The proof theory is shown to be sound relative to this
model theory. FIL avoids many of the problems created by classical course grained
intensional logics that have been used in formal and computational semantics.
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1. Introduction
It has frequently been noted that the characterization of intensions as functions from in-
dices to denotations, as in Montague (1974), yields a semantics which is not suÆciently ne-
grained. For example, logically equivalent expressions are cointensional and so intersub-
stitutable in all contexts, including the complements of propositional attitude predicates.
The view that expressions are cointensional just in case they have the same denotation
across indices has been dominant in formal semantics at least since Carnap (1947).
An alternative view, which we refer to as hyperintensionalism, posits propositions
as independent intensional entities, and takes truth to be a derived relational property.
In the past twenty years a variety of hyperintensionalist theories have been proposed,
including Thomason (1980), situation semantics (Barwise and Perry 1983, Barwise and
Etchemendy 1990, and Seligman and Moss 1997), Landman (1986), property theory (Chier-
chia and Turner 1988, Turner 1987 and Turner 1992), Muskens (1995), and Lappin and
Pollard (1999). With the exception of Turner (1992), these theories have focused on the
interpretative structures while remaining inexplicit or programmatic about the logic.
We depart from this tradition by constructing an explicit proof theory for a ne-
grained logic and then dening a class of models in which the logic is sound. The logic
is broadly similar to Church (1940)'s simple theory of types (SST), augmented with a
coextensionality predicate. It diers crucially from more familiar elaborations of SST
(such as Henkin (1950) and and Gallin (1975)) in having models that falisfy the axiom of
propositional extensionality.
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2. Fine-Grained Intensional Logic
Fine-Grained Intensional Logic (FIL), like SST, incorporates the typed -calculus into a
classical logic.
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2.1 The Set of Types
We dene the set of types in our ne-grained intensional logic FIL as follows.
2.1.1 Basic Types
1. i (individuals concepts)
2. p (propositions)
2.1.2 Exponential Types
If A;B are types, then A
B
is a type.
This is the type system of Church (1940). Unlike Gallin (1975)'s Ty2, there is no additional
type s for possible worlds. For each type A there is (i) a (possibly non-empty) denumerable
set of non-logical constants of type A and (ii) a denumerably innite set of variables of
type A. The constants serve as logical translations of words in a natural language whose
semantic structure is being represented. As usual, in higher-order logic, connective and
quantier symbols are syntactic sugar for logical constants.
We dene the set E
A
of expressions of type A as follows.
1. Every variable of type A is in E
A
.
2. Every constant of type A is in E
A
.
3. If  2 E
A
and u is a variable in E
B
, then u 2 E
A
B .
4. If  2 E
B
A
and  2 E
A
, then () 2 E
B
.
5. If ;  2 E
A
, then  =  2 E
p
.
6. if ;  2 E
A
, then 

=
 2 E
p
.
7. > and ? 2 E
p
.
8. If ;  2 E
p
, then so are
(a) :
(b)  _  
(c)  ^  
(d) !  
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In Fox et al. (2002) we present an extended rst-order Property Theory with Curry typing (PTCT)
as an alternative implementation of the ne-grained intensionalist approach to natural language semantics
that we propose here. We are in the process of exploring the correspondence relations that hold between
FIL and PTCT.
(e) $  
9. If  2 E
p
and u is a variable in E
A
, then 8u and 9u 2 E
p
.
10. If  2 E
p
, then 2 and 3 2 E
p
.
2.2 A Proof Theory for FIL
We formulate our proof theory for FIL as a set of tableau rules. We follow Fitting (2000),
and Fitting and Mendelsohn (1999) in using prexed rules, where a prex  is a positive
integer that corresponds to a possible world.
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A prexed formula  is interpreted as  is
true at  ( 2 w, w the world corresponding to ).
A path P of a tree is closed i (i) P contains both a formula  and its negation :,
or (ii) P contains ?. P is open i it is not closed. A proof of  is a tree T with 1: at the
root of T and all the branches of T are closed.
The symbol * following a premis indicates that it has been used in the course of
a proof and is no longer available for further application of tableau rules. When a rule
requires more than one premis, the premises are separated by commas. In addition to tree
construction rules, the following tableau rules contain three path constraints, the conditions
for Non-Identity, and for Equivalence (1) and (2). We suppress type subscripts in the rules
where the type of an expression is obvious, or not relevant to the rule. In the interests of
space, for the connectives we only give the rules for conjunction, implication, and double
negation.
Top
For any prex ,
:>
?
Conjunction
For any prex ,
(s ^ t)*
s
t
Negated Conjunction
For any prex ,
:(s ^ t)*
kkkk SSS
S
:s :t
Implication
For any prex ,
(s! t)*
kkkk SSS
S
:s t
Negated Implication
For any prex ,
:(s! t)*
s
:t
Boolean Negation
For any prex ,
::s*
s
Negated Quantication
For any prex ,
:Qu*
Q
0
u:
where Q
0
is the dual
of Q
3
In our model theory for FIL we dene a possible world as an ultralter of the boolean pre-lattice of
propositions.
Universal Quantication
8u'
'[=u]
where (i)  is grounded, and
(ii)  occurs on the path (or 
is a new constant in the path)
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Existential Quantication
9u'*
'[=u]
where  is a new constant that
does not occur on the path and
; u 2 A
Identity
For any prex ,
 = ; '
'[=]
Non-Identity
For any prex ,
:( = )
?
-reduction
For any prex ,


0
where 
0
is obtained
from  by substituting
variables of the
appropriate type that
appear in the path for
corresponding bound
variables in 
-reduction
For any prex ,
:::(u)():::
:::[=u]:::
-reduction
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For any prex ,
:::u(u):::
::::::
Equivalence (1)
For any prex ,
:(

=
)
?
Equivalence (2)
For any prex ,
(

=
); :(

=
)
?
Equivalence (3)
For any prex ,
(

=
); (

=
)
(

=
)
Equivalence (4)
For any prex ,
(s

=
t)*
kkkk SSS
S
s
t
:s
:t
Co-extensionality (1)
For any prex ,
(

=
 )
(()

=
 ())
where ;  2 B
A
,
 2 A, and  is a
grounded term that
appears in the path
Co-extensionality (2)
For any prex ,
:(

=
 )*
:(()

=
 ()
;  2 B
A
,  2 A,
and  is a new
constant that does
not appear in the
path
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A term is grounded in the sense of Fitting (2000) i it is a closed term (constant, closed  term, or
closed formula) with a prex .
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-reduction permits us to prove EXT of Church (1940): ` 8f; g(8u(f(u) = g(u)) ! f = g). As
the antecedent of EXT requires intensional identity of f(u) and g(u) for every u, it does not compromise
the intensionality of FIL. Specically, it does not entail 8u; v
2A
(u

=
v ! u = v). We are grateful to Paul
Gilmore for pointing this out to us.
Negated Modality
For any prex ,
:M*
M
0
:
where M and M
0
are
modal operators, and
M
0
is the dual of M
Modality 2 S5
2s

0
s
where 
0
is a prex interger that
appears in the path
Modality 3 S5
3s*

0
s
where 
0
is a new prex interger
that does not appear in the path
Tableau proof methods for other modal logics can be dened by modifying and adding
to the rules for the modal operators, as in Fitting and Mendelsohn (1999).
2.3 Distinguishing Between Equivalence and Identity
The relation = corresponds to identity of intension, while

=
is interpreted as extensional
equivalence of entities of the same type.
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The tableau rules allow us to prove IDENT but
not EXTEN.
IDENT: 8u; v
2A
(u = v ! u

=
v)
EXTEN: 8u; v
2A
(u

=
v ! u = v)
The proof for IDENT is as as follows.
1 :8u; v
2A
(u = v ! u

=
v)*
1 9u; v
2A
:(u = v ! u

=
v)* (Negated Quantication)
1 :(a = b! a

=
b)* (Existential Quantication)
1 a = b
1 :(a

=
b) (Negated Implication)
1 :(a

=
a) (Identity)
1 ? (Equivalence (1))
The tree is closed. The following tableau provides a counterexample to EXTEN.
1 :8u; v
2A
(u

=
v ! u = v)*
1 9u; v
2A
:(u

=
v ! u = v)* (Negated Quantication)
1 :(a

=
b! a = b)* (Existential Quantication)
1 a

=
b
1 :(a = b) (Negated Implication)
The tree is nished and open.
The proof theory for FIL entails that two expressions can be logically equivalent but
not cointensional, and so distinct propositions can imply each other.
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Within the framework of program specication theory, Maibaum (1997) discusses the use of a weak
non-logical equality predicate to express the equivalence/congruence of possibly distinct expressions within
a theory. Gilmore (2001) constructs an intensional simple theory of types (ITT) in which an intensional
(=) and an extensional (=
e
) identity predicate are dened. His proposal diers from that of Fox and
Lappin (2001) and the current version of FIL in that (i) his extensional identity predicate is not type
general, but is only dened for propositions and predicates, and (ii) for us identity and equivalence are
primitive, whereas Gilmore denes them in terms of substitution and bi-implication.
3. A Semantics for FIL
3.1 Intensional Models
Before dening our class of models, we rst review the notions of a frame and a boolean
prelattice, in terms of which these models will be specied. We take a (Henkin) frame
to be a type-indexed family of sets S = hS
A
i such that S
B
A is a (possibly proper) subset
of the set of functions from S
A
to S
B
. We take a boolean prelattice to be a set B with
a preorder (a relation that is transitive, reexive, but not necessarily antisymmetic) v,
two nullary operations T and F , one unary operation
0
(written postx), and four binary
operations u, t, ), ,, subject to the following conditions (here  is the relation on B
such that a  b i a v b and b v a).
1. T is a greatest element.
2. F is a least element.
3. u is a greatest lower bound operation.
4. t is a least upper bound operation.
5. ) is a relative pseudocomplement operation, i.e. For all a; b; c 2 B, c v a ) b i
c u a v b.
6. For all a; b 2 B, (a, b)  ((a) b) u (b( a)).
7. For all a 2 B, a
0
 a) F .
8. For all a 2 B, a
00
 a.
This boolean prelattice is like a boolean algebra except that antisymmetry does not hold:
two distinct elements can be greater than or equal to each other.
We can now dene the class of intensional structures into which FIL is to be inter-
preted. An intensional structure S consists of a frame S = hS
A
i, where S
p
is a boolean
prelattice, together with enough additional structure to interpret all FIL logical constants.
The preorder v is called entailment. It is a theorem that a v b i b belongs to every
ultralter that a belongs to. More generally, we say that a subset X of S
p
entails b 2 S
p
if every ultralter containing X as a subset has b as a member. The specied operations
of S
p
already provide interpretations for the boolean logical constants, and the entailment
preorder models logical consequence. However we must add enough operations to interpret
(at each type A) the equality and coextensionality predicates as well as the universal and
existential quantiers. The additional operations that we require are as follows.
Equality: =
A
is interpreted as an (intensional) identity operation id
A
of type (p
A
)
A
such
that, for all a; b 2 S
A
; id(a; a)  T and id(a; b)  F , whenever a 6= b.
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Universal: 8
A
is interpreted as a type-restricted universal quantication operation
Q
A
of
type p
p
A
such that ff(a)ja 2 S
A
g entails and has as a greatest lower bound
Q
A
(f).
Existential: 9
A
is interpreted as a type-restricted existential quantication operation
`
A
of type p
p
A
, such that,
`
A
(f) is the least upper bound of ff(a)ja 2 S
A
g.
7
In this setting, = (6=) is a meta-theoretic notion of identity (non-identity).
Coextensionality:

=
A
is interpreted as an extensional identity operation extid
A
of type
(p
A
)
A
such that, for all a; b 2 S
A
, extid(a; a)  T , extid(a; b)  extid(b; a), and
(extid(a; b) u extid(b; c)) v extid(a; c). Also, if A = C
B
, then for all f; g 2 S
A
,
extid(f; g) 
Q
B
(h), where h is the function that maps each B-intension b to the
proposition extid(f(b); g(b)). Moreover, extid
p
 ,.
Thus universal and existential quantication are treated as innitary conjunction (greatest
lower bound) and disjunction (least upper bound), respectively.
An intensional model of FIL, is an intensional structure S, together with a function
Int which assigns to each nonlogical constant a type-appropriate intension in S, and to
each logical constant the obvious operation in S. If g is an assignment of variables to type-
appropriate intensions in S, then Int extends uniquely to an interpretation Int
g
of all FIL
terms if we require that Int
g
(x) = g(x) for every variable x, and that application and term
abstraction receive their customary interpretations; i.e. Int
g
(()) = (Int
g
())(Int
g
()),
and Int
g
(x
2A
) is the function that maps each a 2 S
A
to Int
g(x=a)
(). Clearly the value
assigned by Int
g
to a closed term depends only on Int (not on g), and interpretation
respects primitive equality in the sense that lambda-equivalent terms and terms diering
only alphabetically in their bound variables are assigned the same intensions.
To summarize, an intensional model assigns intensions to terms in such a way that
logical constants are interpreted as designated operations, term application and abstraction
are interpreted in the standard way, and lambda and alphabetic variant-equivalent terms
receive the same intensions. Formulas (terms of type p) have as their intensions propositions
(elements of the boolean prelattice S
p
), terms of type i have as their intensions individual
concepts (elements of S
i
), and A-predicates (terms of type p
A
) have as their intensions
A-properties (propositional functions with domain S
A
). Crucially, sentences which are
provably coextensional but not provably equal (-interconvertible or alphabetic variant)
are interpreted as distinct but equivalent (mutually entailing) propositions.
3.2 Constructing Worlds and Denotations Algebraically
Let us hold Int and S xed. Generalizing Kripke (1959)|and Jonsson and Tarski (1951)|
we dene a (possible) world (we have no impossible worlds) to be a maximal consistent
sets of propositions, i.e. an ultralter of the boolean prelattice S
p
. These are in one-to-one
correspondence with the valuations on S
p
, i.e. the boolean homomorphisms from S
p
to the
two-element boolean algebra 2 (or, equivalently, the characteristic functions of ultralters).
The valuation Val
w
corresponding to the ultralter w is its characteristic function.
Again following Kripke, we dene a modal intensional model M = hS; Int ;W;Ri,
where W is the set of worlds, and R is an accessibility relation on the elements of W
(Kripke 1959). For the present version of FIL we assume that R is an equivalence relation
in order to sustain S5.
Given a world w and two intensions s; r of the same type, we say s and r are w-
coextensional just in case the proposition extid(s; r) is in w. It is easy to see that w-
coextensionality is an equivalence relation at each type. We dene the type-indexed family
D
w
= hD
w;A
i of denotations at w by type recursion as follows.
1. D
w;p
= 2 (the truth values).
2. D
w;i
= the quotient of S
i
by the w-coextensionality relation (i.e. the individuals are
the w-coextensionality equivalence classes of individual concepts).
3. D
w;B
A = the set of functions from S
A
to D
B
For any type A, the denotations of type p
A
are functions from S
A
to 2, i.e. charac-
teristic functions of sets of A-intensions.
We can extend the valuation Val
w
associated with w to all of S (i.e. to intensions of
all types) by type recursion.
1. Val
w
(s) = t if s 2 w, f otherwise (for s a proposition).
2. Val
w
(s) = the w-coextensionality equivalence class of s, for s an individual concept.
3. Val
w
(s) = the function from S
A
to D
B
that maps each a 2 S
A
to Val
w
(s(a)) (for
s 2 S
B
A
.)
We can prove Thereoms 1 and 2 by type induction.
Theorem 1 Two intensions are w-coextensional i they have the same value at w.
Given a world w and a variable assignment g, we dene the denotation of a term 
at w, relative to g, written kk
M;w;g
, to be Val
w
(Int
g
()). If  is closed, the subscript g
can be omitted. We then have
Theorem 2 For any term , kk
M;w;g
is
1. Val
w
(Int()), if  is a constant.
2. Val
w
(g()), if  a variable.
3. kk
M;w;g
(Int
g
()), if  is ().
4. the function f with domain S
A
such that for any a 2 S
A
, f(a) = kk
M;w;g(x=a)
, if 
is x
2A
.
5. t if  is >.
6. f if  is ?.
7. t i kk
M;w;g
= f , if  is :.
8. t i kk
M;w;g
= k k
M;w;g
= t, if  is  ^  .
9. t i kk
M;w;g
= t or k k
M;w;g
= t, if  is  _  .
10. t i kk
M;w;g
= fork k
M;w;g
= t, if  is !  .
11. t i kk
M;w;g
= k k
M;w;g
, if  is $  .
12. t i kk
M;w;g(x=a)
= t for all a 2 S
A
, if  is 8x
2A
.
13. t i kk
M;w;g(x=a)
= t for some a 2 S
A
, if  is 9x
2A
.
14. t i kk
M;w;g
= kk
M;w;g
, if  is 

=
.
15. t i Int
g
() = Int
g
(), if  is  = . (So the truth-value of an equality is independent
of the choice of world.)
In addition to the semantic clauses of Theorem 2 we adopt the following conditions
on Val
w
.
Modal Operator Conditions: For 
2p
, kk
M;w;g
is
16. t i k k
M;w
i
;g
= t for all w
i
2 W such that wRw
i
, if  is 2 .
17. t i k k
M;w
i
;g
= t for some w
i
2 W such that wRw
i
, if  is 3 .
It is not diÆcult to show that Theorem 3 holds.
Theorem 3 If there is a proof of a sentence s of FIL, then s is valid relative to the set of
models dened for FIL.
For reasons of space, we will limit ourselves to an outline of the proof. First it is necessary
to prove a lemma stating that if there is a model M , a world w
1
, and a valuation g such
that for the root 1 s of a nished tree T, ksk
M;w
1
;g
= t, then there is an open path P in T
in which for every full sentence r in P, krk
M;w

;g
= t. To establish this lemma, we need
to prove the downward correctness of the tableau rules and constraints. This is done by
showing that each rule and constraint preserves truth, given the clauses of Theorem 2 and
the Modal Operator Conditions of our model theory.
We then prove the lemma through induction on applicaton of the tableau rules and
constraints to the sentences in the open path of a tree. The base of the induction is the
case in which the tree consists of just one sentence to which no rules or constraints apply.
For the inductive step we observe that any expansion P
0
of an open path P is obtained
by a tableau rule to a sentence of P. Downward correctness of the rules insures that every
sentence r of P
0
is true relative to k  k
M;w

;g
, and the sentences of P satisfy the tableau
constraints. Hence, at any point in the construction of a nished tree T whose root is
a sentence 1 s such that ksk
M;w
1
;g
= t, there is an open path P in T in which for every
sentence r krk
M;w

;g
= t. This result holds for both nite and innite trees (trees with
innite paths). This establishes the lemma.
Given the lemma, it follows that if there is a proof for s, then there is no model M ,
no world w, and no valuation g such that k:sk
M;w;g
= t. Therefore, Theorem 3 holds.
4. Conclusion
We have presented a higher-order ne-grained intensional logic for the semantic repre-
sentation of natural languages. The logic contains type general predicates for intensional
identity and extensional equality. The proof procedure permits us to prove that identity of
intension entails identity of extension, but that the converse does not hold. We have con-
structed an algebraic semantics for our logic relative to which our tableau proof procedure
is sound. Unlike alternative hyperintensionalist frameworks that have been proposed, we
can distinguish among equivalent propositions without resorting to impossible worlds to
sustain the distinction. We treat modality separately from intensions. On our approach
intensions are taken as primary, and truth, denotation, and modality are dened in terms
of them.
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